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third-party payers to adopt performance-based agreements that pro-
vide either a discount before payment or an ex post reimbursement on
the basis of treatments’ effectiveness and/or safety issues. Objectives:
This article analyses the strategies currently approved in Italy and
proposes a novel model called “success fee” to improve payment-by-
result schemes and to guarantee patients rapid access to novel
therapies. Methods: A review of the existing risk-sharing schemes in
Italy has been performed, and data provided by the Italian National
report (2012) on drug use have been analyzed to assess the impact on
drug expenditure deriving from the application of “traditional”
performance-based strategies since their introduction in 2006. Results:
Such schemes have poorly contributed to the fulﬁllment of the purpose
in Italy, producing a triﬂing refund, compared with relevant drugs costs
for the National Health System : €121 million out of a total of €3696
million paid. The novel risk-sharing agreement called “success fee” hasee front matter & 2015 Published by Elsevier Inc.
(ISPOR).
.1016/j.jval.2014.09.007
unict.it.
pondence to: Filippo Drago, Department of Clini
rsity of Catania, Via S. Soﬁa 64, Catania, Italy.been adopted for a new high-cost therapy approved for idiopathic
pulmonary ﬁbrosis, pirfenidone, and consists of an ex post
payment made by the National Health System to the manufac-
turer for those patients who received a real beneﬁt from treat-
ment. Conclusions: “Success fee” represents an effective strategy to
promote value-based pricing, making available to patients a rapid
access to innovative and expensive therapies, with an affordable
impact on drug expenditure and, simultaneously, ensuring third-
party payers to share with manufacturers the risk deriving from
uncertain safety and effectiveness.
Keywords: cost-containment, performance-based, reimbursement,
risk-sharing.
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Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research (ISPOR).Introduction
During the last decade pharmaceutical expenditure has rapidly
increased, and burdens more than other health care costs in
many European countries and in the United States [1]. Oncolog-
ical care is one of the ﬁelds in which spending increased faster,
growing up to 21% per annum in recent years [2], because of the
introduction of novel high-cost therapies, together with the
increase in the prevalence of cancer [3].
Many treatments introduced in clinical practice are molecu-
larly targeted agents [4], whose costs vary between an average of
approximately $5,000 (€3,700) to more than $10,000 (€7,400) per
month [5], most often exceeding $25,000 (€18,500) per year. These
treatments, however, often result in beneﬁts measured in
months of survival [6]. In a recent analysis published in Blood
[7], a large group of experts in chronic myelogenous leukemiapointed out examples of dramatically high costs for antineo-
plastic drugs such as bosutinib, ponatinib, and omacetaxine,
concluding that for many clinical conditions, drug prices do not
reﬂect objective beneﬁts in terms of survival prolongation, degree
of tumor shrinkage, or improved quality of life because drug
prices for new medicines are mostly set on the basis of price of
the most recent similar compound commercially available.
High costs, questionable efﬁcacy, and long-term results of
new medicines raised questions about their affordability, appli-
cation in clinics, and cost-effectiveness [8], leading to the need of
adopting cost-containment measures, aimed at reducing expen-
diture for public health. In Europe, third-party payers have
introduced different cost-containment strategies to overcome
the problem of public health expenditure, leading to reimburse-
ment agreements in which the burden is shared with pharma-
ceutical companies and the third-party payer. In an ofﬁcialon behalf of International Society for Pharmacoeconomics and
cal and Molecular Biomedicine, Section of Pharmacology and
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Arrangements (PBRSAs)” Task Force of the International Society
for Pharmacoeconomics and Outcomes Research deﬁned such
agreements as schemes that “involve a plan by which the
performance of the product is tracked in a deﬁned patient
population over a speciﬁed period of time and the amount or
level of reimbursement is based on the health and cost outcomes
achieved” [9]. In other words, in a PBRSA, the ﬁnal remuneration
or reimbursement of a pharmaceutical is linked to a previously
agreed objective, based on effectiveness or budget impact [10].
The aim of this study was to overview the current PBRSAs
approved in Italy so far, where such schemes exist since 2006,
and to critically evaluate the impact of their application on drug
expenditure. The study also proposes a novel tool for the
improvement of cost-containment strategies, called “success
fee,” an evolution of the performance-based reimbursement
concept, already adopted in Italy for the drug pirfenidone,
approved for the treatment of idiopathic pulmonary ﬁbrosis.
Reimbursement Schemes in Europe
Although in Europe several reimbursement schemes have been
adopted and differently recognized, they can be classiﬁed into
two broad categories: ﬁnancial-based schemes and performance/
outcome-based schemes [1]. The former category includes “price
per volume” (focused on controlling ﬁnancial expenditure, with
pharmaceutical companies refunding overbudget situations) and
“patient access scheme” (including free drugs or discounts for an
agreed period to enhance the value of new medicines and
improve the possibility of their funding/reimbursement). PBRSAs
are established “between a payer and a manufacturer of phar-
maceuticals, devices or diagnostics, where the price level and/or
the revenue is related to the future performance of the product in
either a research or a real-world environment” [11].
PBRSAs link the reimbursement or price of the new technol-
ogy/medication to the health outcomes derived from its utiliza-
tion in the “real world”: reimbursement thus depends on future
assessment of clinical end points [12].
Within the European Union, several countries are currently
using some form of PBRSAs, most of them ﬁnancially-based,
because the performance-based schemes adopted so far have
shown critical difﬁculties in terms of applicability [10]. United
Kingdom, The Netherlands, France, and Italy reported a larger use
of PBRSAs than did other countries within the European Union [9].
Reimbursement Schemes in Italy
The Italian National Health System (NHS) has adopted several
instruments to manage budget impact, uncertain clinical out-
come, and appropriate use of medicines. These instruments
include discounts (possibly hidden discounts), price-volume
agreements, performance-based schemes, therapeutic plans,
“AIFA notes,” that is, restriction of prescribing centers, and
monitoring registries used to collect data about drug safety and
effectiveness [9]. The AIFA notes limit reimbursement of the
relevant drugs to population subgroups. The monitoring regis-
tries have represented, since 2005, an advanced tool to ensure not
only prescription appropriateness but also the applicability of
PBRSAs [13]. Most of the drugs included in the registries were
approved under a centralized marketing authorization (often
rapid and/or conditional approval) and are speciﬁcally biologics
and/or high-cost drugs. Reimbursement strategies are made to
ensure not only a rapid patient’s access to drugs but also cost
control. In fact, the adoption of a PBRSA is commonly associated
with a faster patient’s access [14]. When price and reimburse-
ment are negotiated by AIFA and the relevant company, the
choice of the type of PBRSA to be adopted depends on the dataavailable on the efﬁcacy and safety of drugs, as well as on
pharmaceutical products’ characteristics and on the availability
of alternative therapies [10].
Italy has its own classiﬁcation system for PBRSAs, which
includes the following three categories: “cost sharing,” which is a discount for initial cycles of treat-
ment for all eligible patients; “risk sharing,” which sets a partial reimbursement for eligible
nonresponders only, after a clinical evaluation; and “payment by results,”which sets a total reimbursement by the
manufacturer for nonresponders.
The system of applying an initial discount to all eligible patients
used in the “cost-sharing” scheme is simpler to manage than the
system of reimbursement for nonresponders used in the “risk-
sharing” and “payment-by-results” schemes, and it is applied when
reliable data on the efﬁcacy and safety of the medicine are available.
Usually, risk-sharing and payment-by-results schemes are applied in
the case of medicinal products whose risk-beneﬁt ratio has a greater
degree of uncertainty, thus requiring a deﬁnition of nonresponders
that derives from the characteristics and the results of pivotal
clinical trials [13]. For each eligible patient, a ﬁle is opened in the
registry and followed up until reevaluation. To be considered eligible
for reimbursement, it is critical that every patient’s ﬁle is full and
closed at the end of treatment. The distinction between responders
and nonresponders is based on the outcome recorded in the
patient’s ﬁle, according to the respective negotiation agreement.
Table 1 lists the drugs subjected to PBRSAs in Italy at the date
of December 31, 2012. Most of these drugs have been approved for
oncological care.
Analysis of Data Available in Italy
We based our analysis on the data published in the annual report
“Drug Use in Italy: National Report 2012” by Osservatorio Nazionale
sull’impiego dei Medicinali [13]. Table 2 describes the total amount
of money that has been reimbursed by the companies, as of 2012,
for the 22 drugs for which risk-sharing schemes have been
activated since their establishment in 2006. Despite the application
of the three schemes adopted in Italy, it appears that the amount
of money refunded through the reimbursement procedures is
triﬂing: €121 million out of a total of €3696 million (i.e., 3.3%) [15].
Focusing on expenditure/reimbursement data relative to the
market of drugs under PBRSAs for the year 2012, we see that €823
million has been paid by the NHS for the treatment of patients.
Out of this amount, only €46.3 million (5.6%) underwent the
reimbursement procedures, which means that 94.4% of the
expenditure was not considered for refund. Reasons accounting
for such a high percentage of unrequested reimbursements may
be found, at least in part, not only in the high percentage of
patients still under treatment and in interruptions of treatment
for reasons other than the ones provided in the negotiation
agreement but also in patients’ ﬁles that have not been closed
because of the health care center inefﬁciencies, thus preventing
the activation of the reimbursement procedure. Moreover, out of
€46.3 million expected to be refunded after the reimbursement
procedure activation, only €31.3 million (67.7%) has actually been
refunded by the companies (Fig. 1) [13], while the remaining €15
million (32.4%) was not reimbursed because of lack of refund
request by hospitals, inefﬁciency of administrative centers or
management/treatment errors (5 million; 10.8%), and rejection of
refund requests by the companies (10 million; 21.6%) likely
because of other unspeciﬁed formal issues.
Excluding the amount eligible for refund of two of the drugs
included in the PBRSAs (sorafenib and temsirolimus) that are
subject to a mixed mechanism of reimbursement (based on
Table 1 – Performance-based schemes approved in Italy per drug.
Product Indication Reimbursement
scheme
Azacitidine Myelodysplastic syndrome, acute myelogenous leukemia Cost sharing
Bevacizumab Metastatic colorectal cancer, non–small cell lung cancer, metastatic breast cancer, renal cell
carcinoma
Cost sharing
Bortezomib Multiple myeloma Cost sharing
Brentuximab CD30þ Hodgkin’s lymphoma relapsed or refractory Payment by results
Catumaxomab Malignant ascites, EpCAMþ Cost sharing
Cetuximab Squamous cell carcinoma of the head and neck, metastatic colorectal cancer (EGFRþ and WT
KRAS)
Payment by results,
risk sharing
Dasatinib Newly diagnosed adults with Philadelphia chromosome-positive (Phþ) chronic myeloid
leukemia (CML) in chronic phase, chronic, accelerated, or myeloid or lymphoid blast phase
Phþ CML with resistance or intolerance to previous therapy including imatinib, Philadelphia
chromosome-positive acute lymphoblastic leukemia (Phþ ALL) with resistance or intolerance
to previous therapy
Cost sharing
Eribulin
mesylate
Advanced or metastatic breast cancer Payment by results
Erlotinib Metastatic non–small cell lung cancer Cost sharing
Everolimus Renal cell carcinoma, neuroendocrine tumor pNET Payment by results
Geﬁtinib Non–small cell lung cancer (mutated EGFR-TK) Payment by results
Lapatinib Hormone-positive and HER2+ advanced breast cancer Payment by results
Lenalidomide Multiple myeloma Cost sharing
Nilotinib Philadelphia chromosome-positive chronic myelogenous leukemia resistant or intolerant to
previous therapy that included imatinib, newly diagnosed patients with chronic myelogenous
leukemia
Payment by results,
cost sharing
Ofatumumab Chronic lymphocytic leukemia Cost sharing
Panitumumab Metastatic colorectal cancer EGFRþ and KRAS WT Risk sharing
Pazopanib Renal cell carcinoma Payment by results
Pegaptanib Age-related macular degeneration Payment by results
Plerixafor Mobilization of hematopoietic stem cells to the peripheral blood for collection and subsequent
autologous transplantation in patients with non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma and multiple myeloma
Payment by results
Ranibizumab Age-related macular degeneration, diabetic macular edema, and macular edema following
retinal vein occlusion
Payment by results
Sorafenib Hepatocellular carcinoma, renal cell carcinoma Payment by results,
cost sharing
Sunitinib Renal cell carcinoma Cost sharing
Temsirolimus Renal cell carcinoma, mantle cell lymphoma resistant to treatment Payment by results,
cost sharing
Trabectedin Soft tissue sarcomas, relapsed ovarian cancer Payment by results
Trastuzumab HER2-overexpressing metastatic gastric or gastroesophageal junction adenocarcinoma Payment by results
Vinﬂunine Advanced or metastatic transitional-cell carcinoma of the urothelial tract Payment by results
ALL, acute lymphoblastic leukemia; CD30+, Cluster of Differentiation 30 positive; CML, chronic myeloid leukemia; EGFR+, Epidermal growth
factor receptor positive; EGFR-TK, Epidermal Growth Factor Receptor - Tyrosine Kinase; EpCAM+, Epithelial Cell Adhesion Molecule positive;
HER2+, Human Epidermal-growth-factor Receptor 2 positive; KRas, Kirsten Rat sarcoma; Ph+, Philadelphia positive; pNET, primitive Neuro-
Ectodermal Tumor; WT, Wild-Type.
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count provided by “cost-sharing” schemes and the rest is
accounted for by reimbursement for nonresponders provided by
“risk-sharing” (€0.6 million; ∼1.5%) and “payment-by-results”
(€12.3 million; ∼29.8%) schemes.
Considering the high number of registries and the hetero-
geneity of the mechanisms through which regions/companies/
pharmacies/hospitals are actually refunded, the complexity of
this system is remarkable. Moreover, health care professionals
are not prompted to update the registries, close the patients’ ﬁles,
and submit refund requests on a regular basis, possibly because
the actual money to be refunded does not come to the prescribing
center itself, but rather to the hospital general budget, thus
producing a responsibility gap between the stakeholder that will
receive the refund (in this case, the hospital) and the actual
person in charge of the reimbursement procedures (the prescrib-
ing center).Given such caveats, a critical reconsideration of the reim-
bursement processes must take into account the economic
impact of the introduction of expensive therapies on public
health. As far as efﬁcacy is concerned, it has been given the ﬁrst
place in the negotiation process of a medicinal drug and is
considered the main driver for the therapeutic choice. However
with the most critical issues in the application of PBRSAs are
represented so far by the lack of ﬁrst-person responsibility for the
prescribing centers in the reimbursement procedures and by the
fact that refund from manufacturers comes ex post.
“Success Fee”: A New Strategy for Performance-Based
Agreements
To respond to such critical issues, a novel mechanism has been
proposed in Italy for the improvement of the existing PBRSAs.
Named “success fee,” it consists of an ex post payment to the
Table 2 – Total cost and reimbursement amounts for the period 2006 to 2012 in Italy.
Drug
Reimbursement
scheme
Total reimbursement
2007–2012 (€)
Total cost
2006–2012 (€)
% over total cost
per single drug
% over total
reimbursement
Bevacizumab Cost sharing 47,419,548 640,859,288 7.4 39.0
Erlotinib Cost sharing 25,026,477 209,003,042 12.0 20.6
Sorafenib Payment by results,
cost sharing
11,206,335 183,039,972 6.1 9.2
Sunitinib Cost sharing 9,779,791 268,536,204 3.6 8.0
Cetuximab Payment by results 3,997,318 323,324,085 1.2 3.3
Bortezomib Cost sharing 3,730,158 325,321,155 1.1 3.1
Eribulin
mesylate
Payment by results 3,713,984 5,470,192 67.9 3.1
Everolimus Payment by results 3,203,820 31,363,496 10.2 2.6
Lapatinib Payment by results 2,272,128 58,099,651 3.9 1.9
Geﬁtinib Payment by results 1,937,717 40,177,957 4.8 1.6
Panitumumab Risk sharing 1,796,097 35,586,365 5.0 1.5
Ofatumumab Cost sharing 1,426,381 3,693,415 38.6 1.2
Trabectedin Payment by results 1,281,909 36,616,625 3.5 1.1
Vinﬂunine Payment by results 940,371 5,529,130 17.0 0.8
Azacitidine Cost sharing 852,305 57,904,318 1.5 0.7
Pazopanib Payment by results 772,340 7,597,587 10.2 0.6
Temsirolimus Payment by results,
cost sharing
606,390 5,783,170 10.5 0.5
Dasatinib Cost sharing 515,065 71,525,433 0.7 0.4
Plerixafor Payment by results 422,620 3,822,145 11.1 0.3
Trastuzumab Payment by results 420,688 1,309,896,209 0.03 0.3
Nilotinib Payment by results 168,226 73,119,135 0.2 0.1
Catumaxomab Cost sharing 10,696 113,264 9.4 0.0
Total / 121,500,364 3,696,381,837 / 100.0
Note. The analysis includes cost and reimbursement amounts calculated for each drug included in a reimbursement scheme. Values for
percentages of refunded money over the total cost per drug could be as low because for many products the reimbursement scheme is applied
only to some of the approved indications (e.g., trastuzumab).
Fig. 1 – Cost and reimbursement amounts for the year 2012. Data are divided into eligible and not eligible for reimbursement.
The eligible amount includes reimbursement provided by companies, reimbursement unrequested by hospitals, and
nonvalidated.
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Fig. 2 – Comparison between traditional reimbursement schemes and “success fee.” The main feature of “success fee” is the
fact that the payment is provided by the NHS only after the evaluation of efﬁcacy. NHS, National Health System.
V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 8 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1 3 1 – 1 3 6 135manufacturer, applied only for those patients receiving a real
beneﬁt from therapy. The drug is provided by the company at no
initial cost for the NHS. Depending on the disease characteristics,
clinical trials data available, and therapy duration, the NHS and
the pharmaceutical company establish a temporal threshold for
the evaluation of effectiveness to separate responders from
nonresponders. Effectiveness is based on clinical outcomes
deﬁned speciﬁcally for each disease and relies on the efﬁcacyTable 3 – Comparison between PBRSAs approved in Italy
Reimbursement
scheme
Positive features
Cost sharing Applied for all treatments; easy to apply (no f
required)
Risk sharing Based on efﬁcacy outcome
Payment by results Based on efﬁcacy outcome; theoric total
reimbursement of cost for nonresponders
Success fee Based on efﬁcacy outcome; no cost for nonres
prescribing centers are more incentivized (m
nonresponders treatment remain within th
PBRSA, performance-based risk-sharing arrangement.primary end point reported in the registration clinical trial. After
the predeﬁned period of treatment, the NHS provides payment only
for those treatments that have shown effectiveness. Despite what
normally happens with “traditional” PBRSAs, in which reimburse-
ment is made ex post by the manufacturer to the NHS, and is
driven by the population of nonresponders, “success fee” consists
of an ex post payment instead, made by the NHS to the manu-
facturer, and is driven by the population of responders (Fig. 2)..
Negative features
ollow-up Not based on safety/efﬁcacy outcome
Partial reimbursement of the cost for nonresponders;
difﬁcult to apply (requires follow-up and notiﬁcation
to the company); no incentive to start and follow up
the refund procedure for prescribing centers (refund
does not go to the prescribing center but to the
hospital)
Difﬁcult to apply (requires follow-up and notiﬁcation to
the company); no incentive to start and follow up
the refund procedure for prescribing centers (refund
does not go to the prescribing center but to the
hospital)
ponders;
oney for
e center)
Difﬁcult to apply (requires follow-up and notiﬁcation to
the company), but easier than other PBRSAs: no risk
to pay for nonresponders; requires a tax bill to be
provided by the company to give the drug with
initial no payment (solved with a pro forma tax bill
at the beginning of treatment, followed by proper tax
bill only for responders)
V A L U E I N H E A L T H 1 8 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 1 3 1 – 1 3 6136Moreover, given the application difﬁculties of traditional PBRSAs,
due to the gap between the prescribing center notifying the ineffec-
tive treatments and the hospital receiving the refund, with “success
fee” the prescribing centers are incentivized to check for ineffective
treatments because the eventual savings come directly to the centers.
“Success fee” has been applied for the ﬁrst time in Italy to
negotiate the price of a novel drug indicated for mild-to-
moderate idiopathic pulmonary ﬁbrosis, pirfenidone (Esbriet).
The drug is provided by the company at no initial cost for the
NHS. Between day 165 and 195 after the onset of therapy, the
prescribing center certiﬁes the successful or unsuccessful out-
come and gives notice to the company promptly. The outcome is
considered unsuccessful when a decline in forced vital capacity
overcomes a speciﬁc absolute value after the ﬁrst 6 months of
treatment. A failure (of any nature) in delivering the certiﬁcate to
the company is interpreted as a successful treatment and money
has to be paid to the manufacturer. This represents probably the
most critical issue of “success fee” and requires further improve-
ment. In fact, the NHS will also have to pay for ineffective
treatments if the patient’s ﬁle is not closed within the time point
agreed with the manufacturer. One way to overcome this issue
could be to couple the possibility to continue drug prescription
for a patient after the agreed time point only if the certiﬁcation
about successful or failed therapy has been provided to the
manufacturer.Conclusions
Cost-containment strategies aim to overcome the issue of the
adoption of high-cost therapies, such as anticancer drugs, but
they represent the ﬁnal step of a complex process of negotiation.
Our analysis of the application of cost-containment strategies
approved in Italy shows several mismanagement and procedural
problems deriving from the application of “traditional” PBRSAs
such as “payment by results” and “risk sharing.” The total
amount of money that is actually refunded through the applica-
tion of such schemes is really triﬂing, and the larger portion of
that amount comes from discounts that are not based on the
assessment of an outcome (“cost sharing”).
Considered that every procedure may present some limita-
tions in terms of application and overall control, a strategy such
as “success fee” may represent a stronger method to ensure both
the access of patients to novel therapies and the NHS to share
with the manufacturer the risk derived from uncertain efﬁcacy.
“Success fee” introduces the concept of an ex post payment to the
company applied only for patients receiving a real beneﬁt from
therapy, with an initial no cost for the NHS. The most critical
difﬁculties met in the application of the traditional PBRSAs come
from the lack of a direct incentive for the prescribing center in
notifying ineffective treatments, considering that the potential
refund does not go to the center itself but rather to the hospital
general budget. In the case of “success fee”, prescribing centers
are incentivized to check for ineffective treatments (and to notify
them to the manufacturer), because they would have to pay for
effective treatments only, thus saving money in their own budget
in case of inefﬁcacy. “Success fee” may then be proposed for the
negotiation processes of other treatments already in the market
or yet to come, not only in Italy but also in other countries where
the ﬁnal payer is the NHS. Table 3 presents points of strengths
and weaknesses of each of the PBRSAs analyzed in this study.
Finally, because it is accepted that pricing and reimbursement
negotiation processes are aimed at linking payment to health
outcomes, it would be of beneﬁt to deﬁne precise and meaningful
end points to be used in clinical trials so that decision makerscould adopt strategies that pursue real beneﬁts for patients at an
affordable and appropriate cost. The American Society of Clinical
Oncology is working to set such end points, taking into account
not only the overall survival but also the quality of life and the
safety proﬁle of treatments [16]. Based on these considerations,
having a clinically meaningful end point in a clinical trial would
make it easier to deﬁne the value and the consequential price of a
drug, thus reducing uncertainty about treatment efﬁcacy.Acknowledgments
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